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CHINA’S ATTITUDE TOWARD FOREIGN NGOS 
DEYONG YIN∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Notwithstanding the increasing presence of foreign non-governmental 
organizations (“NGOs”) in China, currently only foreign foundations may 
register as international NGOs in China. This lag in legislation is largely 
due to the Chinese government’s concerns about foreign NGOs that try to 
broach politically sensitive subjects such as democracy, human rights, 
labor, or religion. Much confusion has resulted from the lack of explicit 
legal rules, and the situation has blocked foreign NGOs’ access to China 
and prevented them from carrying out work in the country. In practice, 
many foreign NGOs have resorted to alternative means of operation. It is 
time for the Chinese government to revisit this gray area and enact a clear 
and constructive legal framework for foreign NGOs to follow.  
INTRODUCTION: THE GROWTH OF FOREIGN NGOS IN CHINA 
After the birth of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) in 1949, the 
Chinese government abolished or co-opted all independent social groups 
including religious organizations, professional societies, and labor unions. 
In this process, foreign NGOs were compelled to leave China. However, 
since the “Reform and Opening-up” policy of the late 1970s, the 
government adopted a more flexible and variable legitimacy for social 
organizations,1 which resulted in an initial emergence of NGOs.  
Then in the 1990s, the government put a new focus on the state’s 
withdrawal from society. The theme, as advertised by the Chinese 
government, was “small government, big society.” The number of NGOs 
(including foreign NGOs) started to increase dramatically during this 
period, especially after China hosted the fourth World Conference on 
 
 
 ∗ Visiting Research Scholar, US-Asia Law Institute, New York University School of Law. The 
author extends thanks to Professor Jerome A. Cohen for his insightful guidance during the writing of 
this Article.  
 1. After the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the socialist transformation movement actually 
transformed most social organizations into state- or collective-owned organizations. Starting in 1978, 
the Reform and Opening-up policy introduced the concepts of market economy and private property, 
which fostered the emergence of a civil society. The government also adopted a more open attitude 
toward social organizations, but there was no specific law or regulation on social organizations at the 
beginning of the Reform and Opening-up policy, and the first such law appeared in 1989. 
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Women in 1995. Now both foreign and indigenous social groups have 
proliferated. According to statistics from the Ministry of Civil Affairs, by 
the end of 2006 there were altogether 354,000 civil organizations 
nationwide, a 10.6% increase from last year.2 However, counting 
unregistered social groups, some domestic scholars estimate that the actual 
number of all types of NGOs in China is about three million.3 The above 
figures do not include foreign NGOs in China. It is impossible to calculate 
the exact number of international groups operating in China because there 
are no uniform registration rules for foreign NGOs and many do not have 
offices or staff permanently based in China.  
Not only are no official statistics available, but those provided by other 
sources differ greatly. For example, a conservative estimate by China 
Development Brief indicates that more than 490 international NGOs (such 
as the World Wildlife Fund, Friends of the Earth, Save the Children, 
Oxfam, and the Lions) and major international foundations (such as the 
Ford Foundation, the Asia Foundation, and the Rockefeller Foundation) 
have set up projects and opened offices in China.4
 
But according to Wang 
Ming, Director of the NGO Research Center at Tsinghua University, 
between three and six thousand foreign NGOs are based in China, 
including about two thousand foundations, one thousand implementing 
groups, twenty-five hundred chambers of commerce, and one thousand 
faith-based organizations. Wang claims that most of these organizations 
are not registered, but operate under silent endorsement from the 
authorities.5 
International NGOs have made great contributions to China’s 
economic and social development in the fields of environmental 
protection, humanitarian aid, poverty alleviation, development assistance, 
health, education, family, etc. Their interactions with China and 
particularly with Chinese NGOs are contributing to the development of a 
civil society in China.  
 
 
 2. Min zheng bu fa bu 2006 nian min zhen shi ye fa zhan tong ji bao gao [The Ministry of Civil 
Affairs Issuing the 2006 Statistical Report on the Development of Civil Affairs] (Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Min zheng bu [The Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China]), May 23, 
2007, http://cws.mca.gov.cn/article/gzdt/200711/20071100003846.shtml (P.R.C.). 
 3. Chen Xiangyang, Fei zheng fu zu zhi zai Zhongguo de xian zhuang ji tiao zhan [Status of 
NGOs in China and the Challenges], ZHONGGUO JINGJI SHIBAO [CHINA ECON. TIMES], May 26, 2005, 
available at http://www.chinanpo.gov.cn/web/showBulltetin.do?id=19837&dictionid=1835. 
 4. Renee Yuen-Jan Hsia & Lynn T. White III, Working amid Corporatism and Confusion: 
Foreign NGOs in China, 31 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q., 329, 334 (2002). 
 5. Jie Chen, NGO Community in China Expanding Linkages with Transnational Civil Society 7 
(Working Paper No. 128, 2005), available at http://wwwarc.murdoch.edu.au/wp/wp128.pdf. 
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I. THE CURRENT REGULATORY STRUCTURE FOR FOREIGN NGOS 
Whether registered or not, NGOs are multiplying in China. But 
notwithstanding the increasing presence of foreign NGOs and their 
contributions to China’s development, in general, they still remain a 
marginal group without legal status. 
A. The Lack of a Legal Basis for Registering As a Foreign NGO (Other 
Than a Foreign Foundation) 
In China social organizations are divided into three categories: 
foundations (Ji jin), social groups (She hui tuan ti) and private non-
enterprise entities (Min ban fei qi ye dan wei).6 At present there are no 
uniform NGO laws, but the State Council has promulgated regulations for 
each category of NGO, including the Regulations on the Registration and 
Administration of Social Groups (She hui tuan ti deng ji guan li tiao li) 
(1998), the Provisional Regulations on the Registration and 
Administration of Private Non-enterprise Entities (Min ban fei qi ye dan 
wei deng ji guan li zan xing tiao li) (1998), and the Regulations for the 
Administration of Foundations (Ji jin hui guan li tiao li) (2004). In 
addition, the Ministry of Civil Affairs promulgated the Interim Measures 
on the Registration of Private Non-enterprise Entities (Min ban fei qi ye 
dan wei deng ji zan xing ban fa) (1999) and the Interim Measures for 
Banning Illegal Non-governmental Organizations (Qu di fei fa min jian zu 
zhi zan xing ban fa) (2000). Under the above regulations, NGOs are 
subject to a “dual registration and supervision” regime, that is, NGOs must 
be registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs or local Civil Affairs 
Departments, and prior to such registration, a social group must first find 
and obtain approval from an organizational sponsor, or business 
supervisory unit (Ye wu zhu guan bu men).  
None of the above regulations, however, specifically addresses the case 
of foreign NGOs. The Regulations for the Administration of Foundations 
are, of course, an exception, but in reality, foundations represent only a 
relatively small number of the total number of foreign NGOs entering 
China. This lack of clearly defined rules and procedures has caused 
 
 
 6. Ming Wang, Fei ying li zu zhi de she hui gong neng ji qi fen lei [The Social Function and 
Categorization of Non-profit Organizations], XUESHU YUEKAN [ACAD. MONTHLY] Sept. 2006, at 8, 
10, available at http://www.chinanpo.gov.cn/web/showBulltetin.do?type=pre&id=25702&dictionid= 
1835&catid=.  
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difficulties and confusion for foreign NGOs seeking to register and carry 
out work in China.  
The Ministry of Civil Affairs and local Civil Affairs departments at 
county and higher levels are the government agencies in charge of 
registration and management of social organizations.7 The Social 
Organization Administration Bureau within the Ministry of Civil Affairs is 
responsible for the registration and annual inspection of foreign NGOs in 
China.8 Directly under the Ministry of Commerce, the China International 
Center for Economic and Technical Exchanges (“CICETE”) has been 
cooperating actively with international NGOs and Chinese enterprises 
through its associate body, the China Association for Non-governmental 
Organization Cooperation (“CANGO”).9 In turn, CANGO acts as an 
intermediary agency and partners with foreign NGOs, bilateral and 
multilateral organizations, and even Chinese NGOs to enhance 
fundraising, provision of technical support, and capacity-building of 
grassroots NGOs in China.10 Some provinces have established 
international NGO societies under the jurisdiction of the provincial 
Department of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (such as 
YINGOS in Yunnan Province, the Anhui NGO Association, and the 
Sichuan Association for NGO Cooperation). These societies facilitate and 
coordinate cooperation with foreign NGOs in their jurisdictions for 
various poverty alleviation and development projects, and they assist in 
obtaining registrations, visas, work permits, tax exemptions, and other 
matters to be coordinated for project implementation.11 
Currently there is no legal framework for registering as an international 
NGO in China, other than as a foreign foundation. The Regulations on the 
Registration and Administration of Social Groups, promulgated by the 
State Council in 1998, are the major NGO regulation in China. But the 
crucial issue here is whether the Regulations apply to foreign NGOs. 
 
 
 7. See She hui tuan ti deng ji guan li tiao li [Regulation on Registration and Administration of 
Social Organizations] (promulgated by the St. Council, Oct. 25, 1998, effective Oct. 25, 1998), art. 6 
LAWINFOCHINA (last visited May 3, 2009). 
 8. Min jian zu zhi guan li ju ji gou zhi neng [Institutional Duties of the Social Organization 
Administration Bureau] (Zhonghua Renmin Gonghehuo Min jian zu zhi guan li ju [The Social 
Organization Administration Bureau]), http://mjj.mca.gov.cn/article/jgzn/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2009) 
(P.R.C.). 
 9. China International Center for Economic and Technical Exchanges (CICETE), About 
CICETE, http://www.cicete.org/english/aboutus.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2009). 
 10. China Association for NGO Cooperation (CANGO), About Us, http://www.cango.org/ 
english/ABOUT%20US/About%20Us%20.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2009). 
 11. See, e.g., The Bureau of Commerce of Anhui Province, A Brief Introduction to Anhui NGO 
(Sept. 8, 2005), http://www.ahbofcom.gov.cn/Item.asp?ArticleID=1eacpz200598104254.  
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Article 2 of the Regulations specifically defines “social organizations” to 
mean voluntary groups formed by Chinese citizens in China. Therefore, 
foreign organizations must operate under separate rules.12 But thus far, no 
separate rules have been enacted. This is a great barrier to foreign NGOs 
seeking to operate in China, because without legally registered 
representative offices, foreign NGOs are not allowed to admit members or 
raise funds in China. 
Some foreign NGOs have special agreements with national-level 
partners and have obtained special approval from the central government 
to open an officially recognized representative office. One example is the 
Ford Foundation. With a long history in China since 1980, the Ford 
Foundation was the first international NGO to establish an office in China 
in 1988. It signed a memorandum of agreement with its sponsoring unit 
(Gua kao dan wei), the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (as 
representative of the Chinese Government),13 and was granted a special 
license to establish a representative office in China, as well as tax-exempt 
status.  
B. Foreign Foundation Registration 
In contrast, the Regulations for the Administration of Foundations 
applies to both Chinese and overseas foundations working in China. Under 
this regulation, a “foundation” is defined as a non-profit legal person 
established in accordance with the regulation by making use of the 
property donated by natural persons, legal persons, or other organizations 
with the purpose of pursuing welfare undertakings,14 which are of two 
kinds: the public offering foundation (a foundation that solicits 
contributions from the general public) and the non-public offering 
foundation (a foundation that is prohibited from soliciting contributions 
from the general public).15 The Ministry of Civil Affairs is responsible for 
the administrative work of registering the representative offices 
established by overseas foundations within mainland China.16 Moreover, 
 
 
 12. This has also been made clear by the Ministry of Civil Affairs on the NPO website it 
sponsors for non-profit organizations. See State Soc. Action Admin. Bureau, Online Consultation, 
http://www.chinanpo.gov.cn/web/ywzxBizqa.do?action=findBizQas&websitId=100&schema=npo 
(last visited Jan. 20, 2009). 
 13. The Ford Foundation, CHINA DEV. BRIEF, http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.com/dingo/ 
Sector/Gender/2-14-0-64-0-0.html (last visited May 24, 2009). 
 14. Regulations on Foundation Administration (adopted by the St. Council, Feb. 4, 2004, 
effective June 1, 2004), art. 2, translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Feb. 4, 2009) (P.R.C.). 
 15. Id. art. 3. 
 16. Id. art. 6. 
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the Regulations for the Administration of Foundations requires all 
foundations, including representative offices of overseas foundations, to 
partner with a government “business supervisory authority” (Ye wu zhu 
guan dan wei) before registering with Civil Affairs.17 In the case of 
overseas foundations, this authority is a relevant department of the State 
Council or the organizations authorized by the State Council.18 The 
business supervisory authority is responsible for providing direction and 
supervision and for conducting an annual review of the foundation’s 
activities. This arrangement mirrors the current rules for social 
organizations and private non-enterprise entities. 
The enactment of the Regulations for the Management of Foundations 
represents the first instance in China’s growing body of non-profit 
organization laws in which NGOs are explicitly addressed. Yet this effort 
to regulate international organizations is blurred. The rules do not stipulate 
clearly which of the forty-eight articles are intended to apply to 
international foundations. For example, it remains unclear whether 
overseas foundations will need to commit to a minimum expenditure 
threshold, along the lines of the initial endowments required for Chinese 
foundations to register. Moreover, in response to questions from 
international groups, officials from the Ministry of Civil Affairs frankly 
admitted that many aspects of implementation have yet to be defined.19  
Another ambiguity arises out of the peculiar taxonomy of NGOs in 
China, which may be quite confusing from a foreigner’s point of view, and 
from the fact that the specific types of foreign NGOs that fall under the 
category of “foundations” remains to be defined. International grant-
making foundations with a presence in China clearly fall within the scope 
of the foundation regulations, but international humanitarian, relief, and 
development NGOs do not generally regard themselves as foundations, 
and in their own national jurisdictions are usually lawfully established in 
the more general category of “charitable organizations.” Yet the emerging 
official taxonomy of China’s non-profit sector suggests that in the minds 
of Chinese officials, international development NGOs may in fact qualify 
as foundations—and thus the new rules may provide a useful registration 
opportunity.20 Insofar as they both raise money and spend it on 
implementing their own projects, these public offering/fundraising 
 
 
 17. Id. art. 13. 
 18. Id. art. 7. 
 19. Blurred Law May Be Better Than None, CHINA DEV. BRIEF, June 10, 2004, http://www. 
chinadevelopmentbrief.com/node/110. 
 20. Id. 
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foundations resemble operational NGOs—such as Action Aid, CARE, 
Oxfam, Plan, Save the Children, the Salvation Army, World Vision, and 
the World Wildlife Fund for Nature far more than they resemble private 
philanthropic organizations such as the Ford or Hewlett Packard 
Foundations. “It would therefore be quite logical for Chinese officials to 
treat these operational international NGOs as ‘public fundraising 
foundations’—irrespective of how they regard themselves—and to expect 
them to follow the new registration procedures.”21 
According to information obtained from the Civil Organization 
Administration Bureau of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, by the end of 
2007, more than eleven representative offices of overseas foundations in 
China had registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs, including six from 
the United States (the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Clinton 
Foundation, HOPE Foundation, etc.), three from Hong Kong (the China 
Kind Fund, Li Ka Shing Foundation, etc.) and two from Switzerland (the 
World Economic Forum and World Wildlife Fund).22 
Therefore, at present among foreign NGOs, only foreign foundations 
can establish official representative offices in China; other NGOs wishing 
to become active in China have no legal framework to guide them or even 
guarantee them the ability to carry on operations in the country. In 
practice, the Chinese government seems to have adopted an informal 
policy of “no recognition, yet no prohibition,” as long as the work of a 
foreign NGO is not politically sensitive.23 The activities of foreign NGOs 
are governed by disparate instructions from the Ministry of Civil Affairs 
that have arisen in response to questions from local leaders about foreign 
NGOs.  
C. Ambiguous Rules on NGO Operations 
Foreign NGOs in the United States, Europe, Latin America, and Africa 
share a relative autonomy from states. The tradition of a centrist 
government in China does not allow such independence.24 “The party-state 
prefers to view social groups as a ‘transmission belt’ for its policies rather 
than as autonomous social actors that can monitor the government . . . .”25 
 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. Fen Cheng, 11 jia jing wai ji jin hui luo di zhong guo [Eleven Overseas Foundations Landing 
in China], GONG YI SHI BAO [PUBLIC WELFARE TIMES], Jan. 9, 2008, available at http://mjj.mca.gov. 
cn/article/xzglxw/200801/20080100010341.shtml. 
 23. Hsia & White, supra note 4, at 338.  
 24. Id. at 331. 
 25. Id. at 331–32 (quoting HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA, CHINA: SOCIAL GROUPS SEEK 
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This attribute is, however, changing during the reform era, as social 
organizations have gradually gained a more “flexible and variable 
legitimacy” and are given more social space and autonomy.26 But this 
autonomy is still quite limited and the relationship between the 
government and social groups remains too close to classify the social 
groups as real “non-governmental” organizations. This may also be true of 
foreign NGOs in China. 
The regulations on the administration and supervision NGOs’ activities 
are relatively simple, and the government has not established an effective 
regime for supervising foreign NGOs. The overarching principles of 
“abiding by the constitution and law, protecting the unity, security or 
ethnic harmony of the state” and “not harming the interests of the state or 
offending social morality,” as provided for under both the 1998 Social 
Organization Regulation and the Regulation on the Administration of 
Foundations, govern the activities of social groups.27 The definitions of 
“state interest and security,” “social morality” and the legality of various 
activities have not been clearly defined, leaving great latitude and 
discretion for the government when dealing with specific NGOs. 
Moreover, although the laws seem somewhat straightforward or strict on 
paper, many provinces and localities find ways of bending the laws to their 
material advantage.  
According to the 1998 Regulations on the Registration and 
Administration of Social Groups and the Regulation on the Administration 
of Foundations, social organizations and foundations (including 
representative offices of overseas foundations) are subject to dual 
supervision by both the Ministry of Civil Affairs and the professional 
leading unit. The Ministry of Civil Affairs has significant supervisory 
power over social organizations. It is responsible for conducting an annual 
inspection of social organizations and foundations, and, pursuant to this 
authority, it may issue warnings, order organizational changes or cancel an 
NGO’s registration if it spots misconduct.28 In addition, it performs routine 
supervision and administration of the activities of the foundations 
(including the representative offices of an overseas foundation).29 The 
major responsibilities of the professional leading unit include supervising 
and guiding the NGO in observance of law and national policy, 
 
 
INDEPENDENCE IN REGULATORY CAGE (1997)). 
 26. Id. at 332. 
 27. Id. at 339. 
 28. See Regulations on Foundation Administration, supra note 14, art. 34(2). 
 29. See id. art. 34(2). 
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developing activities according to its charter, and conducting a preliminary 
stage of the annual review.30 Not surprisingly, some foreign NGOs have 
decided to forgo this route and operate as unregistered entities. This may 
explain why many grassroot NGOs do not want to register officially. 
In China, although the role of government is shifting, its power still 
permeates all aspects of society. To facilitate a foreign NGO’s work in 
China, it may be preferable for the NGO to develop a good relationship 
with relevant government agencies and to collaborate with them. 
Moreover, it is well accepted that sustainable projects usually come from 
working with existing structures. Most of these structures in the PRC are 
government-owned or -influenced, so that maintaining good relations with 
various levels of the state is essential.31 Many international foundations 
and NGOs are therefore open to partnership with the Chinese government 
and view such a relationship as essential to accomplishing their mission. 
This is especially true of NGOs devoted to less politically sensitive 
concerns, like poverty alleviation, health, or education.  
Some organizations have one de jure sponsoring body but use another 
state agency as their de facto guarantor. The official sponsoring agency of 
Oxfam Hong Kong is FESCO, which helps the NGO hire Chinese citizens 
and also helps Oxfam administratively. In its actual development projects, 
however, Oxfam works with the Aid-the-Poor Foundation for its Yunnan 
projects, the Nationalities Commission for projects in Guangxi, and the 
Department of Agriculture projects in Guizhou.32 
II. THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT’S ATTITUDES TOWARD FOREIGN NGOS 
The ambiguity, or even the lack, of legislation regarding the access and 
operation of foreign NGOs in China as discussed above reflects the 
suspicious or mixed feelings of the Chinese government toward foreign 
NGOs. Generally speaking, NGOs that try to broach politically sensitive 
subjects, such as human rights, labor, or religion, are few and far between, 
and are constantly at risk of abrupt closure; in contrast, NGOs operating in 
areas of lesser political sensitivity, such as environmental education or 
advocacy, health activities, services for the disabled, or general education, 
 
 
 30. Regulation on Registration and Administration of Social Organizations, supra note 7, art. 28; 
Regulations on Foundation Administration, supra note 14, art. 35. 
 31. Hsia & White, supra note 4, at 340. 
 32. Id. at 342. 
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can usually carry out their activities with relatively few restrictions and 
little interference.33  
A. Favorable Attitudes Toward Foreign NGOs 
In spite of the restrictive legal environment, experts note that 
government officials are now generally less negative about NGOs than in 
the past. “Outright hostility has been replaced by a more laissez faire 
attitude,” says one interlocutor.34 Why would a one-party government like 
China allow NGOs to exist? What are the reasons to be optimistic about 
international NGO development in China?  
1. Domestically: Development and Social Need 
With the implementation of the Reform and Opening-up policy that 
began in the late 1970s, the shift from a planned economy toward a market 
economy has triggered profound changes in China’s social structure. First, 
the structure of a powerful government overseeing a weak society has 
changed greatly and the political system characterized by a high degree of 
centralization of state power has become more flexible. As a result, the 
Chinese government has transferred its power to a lower level in both the 
political and economic fields, and the organs of government have been 
reduced to a greater extent. At the same time, a non-state sector has risen 
and the private economy and different forms of social forces have begun to 
play an increasingly powerful role in facilitating political change and 
promoting good governance. As a result of economic reform and the 
modernization drive, competing interests and constituencies within 
Chinese society have emerged. The increasing pluralism, diversity of 
interests, and gaps between different regions, social classes, and groups 
have prompted citizens to organize in order to articulate and pursue shared 
interests. Such developments signal an emerging civil society in China.  
Second, as China becomes more diversified and pluralized, a large 
number of problems concerning social public affairs have emerged. 
Twenty years of reforms, openness, and economic growth have brought 
prosperity to many Chinese citizens. Poverty has been dramatically 
 
 
 33. EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES BEIJING CHINA, ESTH REPORT: A JANUARY 2003 REPORT 
FROM EMBASSY BEIJING (2003), http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/report0103ngo.html 
[hereinafter EMBASSY BEIJING].  
 34. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol8/iss3/4
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reduced.35 Yet, at the same time, economic liberalization has created 
serious social problems, such as urban unemployment, rural migration, a 
growing disparity between the rich and poor and among regions, 
environmental degradation, and the rapid spread of AIDS and HIV.36 In 
fact, the realization that neither the Chinese government, nor the market, 
can solve these problems alone became an impetus for the development of 
NGOs in China.  
These social issues benefit from NGO intervention in many ways. First, 
NGOs can mobilize large amounts of resources and social capital that are 
instrumental to China’s social and economic development. In particular, 
non-Chinese NGOs have played a considerable role in delivering services 
in areas such as poverty alleviation, environment, education, health, social 
welfare, and facilitating the development of disadvantaged regions. They 
have reduced the financial burden on the Chinese government, especially 
in terms of the government’s welfare role, and have helped in the planning 
and coordination of the market economy. The Chinese government 
estimates that foreign NGOs annually bring in one hundred to two hundred 
million dollars, which it acknowledges as “a contribution that cannot be 
dismissed.”37 Second, generally speaking, foreign NGOs have played a 
positive role in promoting the Reform and Opening-up policy in China. 
For example, foreign NGOs supported and participated in the theoretical 
debate on and experimentation of the original economic reforms. They 
have also facilitated the preparation of theory, policy, and human 
resources for economic reform in China through, for example, offering 
economic support, engaging scholars and experts, providing training 
opportunities, and arranging exchanges with foreign universities and 
 
 
 35. An article on the website of the China State Council Leading Group Office of Poverty 
Alleviation and Development pointed out that, according to the statistics of the World Bank, the 
population below international poverty line in China decreased by 0.167 billion from 1980 to 1990, 
and 0.115 billion from 1990 to 1999. See Angang Hu et al., Zhongguo jing ji zeng zhang yu jian shao 
pin kun (1978–2004) [Economic Growth and Poverty Alleviation in China (1978–2004)] QUINGHUA 
DAXUE XUEBAO (ZHEXUE SHEHUI KEXUE BAN) [J. TSINGHUA U. (PHIL. & SOC. SCI.)] Vol. 21(5), at 
105, 106 (2006), available at http://www.cpad.gov.cn/data/2007/0411/article_333823.htm . 
 36. In April, 2007, a high level United Nations official warned the Chinese government that 
environmental degradation, resource depletion, and the rising wealth gap must be faced if Beijing 
wants to maintain economic growth. See UN Warns China: “Tackle Social Problems, Not Just the 
Economy,” ASIANEWS.IT, Apr. 20, 2007, http://www.asianews.it/index.php?art=9048&l=en. In 
February 2009, in response to questions posed by “netizens” at the central government and the Xinhua 
News Agency websites, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao acknowledged that China’s social and economic 
development does have the problem of “imbalanced, discordant and unsustainable” growth. See 
Premier: China to Narrow Wealth Gap in Economic Development, CHINAVIEW.CN, Feb. 28, 2009, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-02/28/content_10918111.htm. 
 37. Wei Qiu & Li Liu, Tou shi ri yi zou jin Zhongguo de guo ji fei zheng fu zu zhi [Perspective on 
International NGOs Approaching China], XUEXIYUEKAN [STUDY MONTHLY], 2005 (05), at 47. 
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research institutes.38 Moreover, foreign NGOs have helped raise awareness 
for the socially underprivileged, public services, volunteerism, and 
environmental protection and have helped China move closer to becoming 
a “rule of law” society.39  
In addition, the dissatisfaction and complaints of citizens stemming 
from the increasing wealth gap and other social issues require a reasonable 
channel of release. State leaders believe that social groups, if carefully 
monitored, can provide a politically safe conduit for people’s voices to be 
heard,40 so as to avoid protests and social chaos.41 The current Hu Jiantao 
government, more than ever, is greatly concerned with social reforms in 
areas such as welfare, medical care, and education and encourages the 
development of the non-state sector as a means of performing regulatory 
functions and achieving the effective provision of public and social 
services.42  
2. Internationally: Pressure from Globalization and Integration into 
the International Community 
In an age of growing global interdependence, we not only share the 
benefits of globalization, but  
we also now face a set of profound global threats to human security 
and prosperity . . . and to the sustainability of our planet—from the 
spread of deadly weapons to the spread of deadly disease; from 
global warming to the persistence of pernicious poverty. These 
problems are not contained by national borders, and even the largest 
and most powerful countries increasingly find that they are unable 
 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Hsia & White, supra note 4, at 335. 
 41. Dong Fang, Zhongguo fei zheng fu zu zhi wei he de yi da fa zhan [Why the NGOs in China 
Are Very Developed], VOICE OF AMERICA, May 16, 2006, http://www.voanews.com/chinese/archive/ 
index.cfm?month=5/15/2006. 
 42. As George J. Gilboy and Benjamin L. Read point out:  
[T]he Hu-Wen leadership conducted a considerable shift in politics and policy after assuming 
power, responding to social pressures resulting from great wealth disparities, social strife, 
corruption, and environmental damage that had developed in the 1990s. . . . As they have 
consolidated power, Hu and Wen have continued to stress that the CCP must change in order 
to survive, with a renewed focus on improving legitimacy, transparency, and governing 
capacity in response to a changing society.  
George J. Gilboy & Benjamin L. Read, Political and Social Reform in China: Alive and Walking, 
WASHINGTON Q., Summer 2008, 143, 152–53, available at http://www.twq.com/08summer/index. 
cfm?id=308. 
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to address these challenges without the help of what we now call 
“the international community.”43 
Global interdependence fosters the rapid development and growing 
importance of global civil society and transnational NGOs are an 
important player in the international community. “[T]hey have been a 
powerful force for institutional innovation, compliance monitoring, and 
policy change since the mid-twentieth century.”44 They have exerted great 
influence on governments and inter-governmental organizations to address 
a wide range of problems, including issues of human rights, environmental 
protection, and so forth.45  
The Chinese government’s increased tolerance of foreign social groups 
has also resulted from the government’s desire to achieve greater influence 
on the international front.46 China has benefited significantly from the 
opening-up policy; it has realized that it cannot develop in isolation from 
the rest of the world and that its development and prosperity are 
interrelated with and dependent on that of the world as a whole. As a 
result, China has been actively seeking to join the globalization process 
and be accepted into the global village. At the same time, with surging 
economic strength, China is trying to get rid of its old image as “backward 
and weak” and desires to be recognized as a strong and responsible nation 
that can be influential in world affairs. On the one hand, more than ever 
before, China cares about the views and attitudes of the international 
community toward it. On the other hand, China faces increasing 
international pressure to live up to international standards. Due to the 
special role of international NGOs in international society, cooperating 
with international NGOs will no doubt further China’s goal of gaining 
recognition and influence worldwide. Thus, the Chinese government 
regards cooperation with international NGOs as part of its opening-up and 
as an inevitable element in the pursuit of globalization.47 
 
 
 43. Stephen Heintz, President, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, The Role of NGOs in Modern 
Societies and an Increasingly Interdependent World, Remarks Before the Annual Conference of the 
Institute for Civil Society 9 (Jan. 14, 2006), available at http://www.rbf.org/usr_doc/The_Role_of 
NGOs_in_Modern_Societies_and_Increasingly_Interdependent_World.pdf. 
 44. Daniel C. Thomas, International NGOs, State Sovereignty, and Democratic Values, 2 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 389, 391 (2001).  
 45. Id. 
 46. Hsia & White, supra note 4, at 333. 
 47. Qiusha Ma, Quanqiuhua, Guo ji fei zheng fu zu zhi yu Zhongguo min jian zu zhi de fa zhan 
[Globalization, International Non-governmental Organizations and the Development of Non-
governmental Organizations in China], KAI FANG SHI DAI [OPEN TIMES], 2006(02), at 123, http://base. 
china-europa-forum.net/rsc/docs/doc_547.pdf. 
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B. Concerns of the Chinese Government over the Growing Presence of 
Foreign NGOs 
While recognizing the potential contributions of foreign NGOs, the 
Chinese government is also becoming increasingly wary of the growing 
presence of foreign NGOs in the country and has warned against the 
“potential national threat” that they may pose. In 2006 the Study Times 
(Xue xi shi bao), the official newspaper of the Central Party School of 
China’s Communist Party, ran an article by Professor Liqing Zhao entitled 
How to Assess Foreign NGOs in China.48 According to Zhao, while the 
Chinese government appreciates the positive effects foreign NGOs have 
had in promoting social development in China, it is also concerned about 
the negative roles foreign NGOs are playing.49 Foreign NGOs “undermine 
national security,” “destroy political stability,” “foster corruption,” as well 
as “propagate foreign practices [not suitable for China’s national 
conditions],” Zhao writes.50 Specifically, Zhao warns that some foreign 
NGO bodies in China “spy on and gather information on China’s military, 
political, and economic information.”51 Zhao’s article also emphasizes that 
foreign NGOs have already spread not just at the grassroots level, but also 
into universities, governmental organs, the Communist Party, and even the 
People’s Congress.52  
Such attitudes originate from a multitude of concerns. First, the growth 
of NGOs inevitably raises associational issues, which are regarded as 
delicate and contentious in China. The Chinese government is concerned 
that if NGOs develop too fast and become too numerous, they may pose a 
threat to the party-state. “Increased exposure to the West via foreign 
organizations, authorities feel, may exacerbate underlying social tensions 
and may lead to adoption of Western ideas of liberty, further endangering 
government control of the populace.”53 The government’s fear of these 
subjects has been greatly heightened by its experience over the last several 
years with the Falungong movement. “In the late 1990s, concerned about 
NGOs like Falungong, the Chinese government launched a campaign to 
 
 
 48. Liqing Zhao, Ru he kan dai zai Zhongguo de wai guo fei zheng fu zu zhi [How to Deal with 
Foreign NGOs in China], XUE XI SHI BAO [STUDY TIMES], http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo. 
asp?NewsID=94532. Liqing Zhao is a researcher at the Institute of International and Strategic Studies 
of the Central Party School of the CCP. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Hsia & White, supra note 4, at 337. 
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‘rectify’ and ‘regularize’ existing NGOs by requiring all NGOs to re-
register at the Ministry or Department of Civil Affairs,” and as a result 
some NGOs were closed down.54 
Second, a constant concern of the Chinese government is that some 
NGOs supported by governments of Western countries may have a motive 
to subvert the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”) through 
“peaceful transformation,”55 similar to the “color revolutions” that 
occurred in Eastern European and Central Asian nations like Georgia and 
the Ukraine. One of the characteristics of these revolutions was NGO 
involvement, i.e., the financial backing or participation of some Western 
NGOs.56 The Chinese government pays particular attention to those NGOs 
that have accepted funds from overseas foundations or foreign NGOs, lest 
they become a driving force to launch a color revolution in China.57 
In addition, there are sovereignty concerns:  
Since the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648, the doctrine of 
unconditional state sovereignty has been a central pillar of 
international law—states were not to interfere with each other’s 
handling of matters within their jurisdiction . . . . In recent decades, 
though, NGOs have played a major role in making non-interference 
conditional upon a state’s compliance with international human 
rights law. . . . The widespread (albeit often purely formal) 
acceptance of international human rights conventions has thus made 
states more vulnerable to transnational pressures for political 
change from local activists linked to international NGOs, foreign 
governments, and international organizations.58  
These international human rights NGOs often cooperate with 
domestic groups or human rights activists. Insisting that human 
rights issues essentially belong to a nation’s internal affairs, the 
Chinese government was opposed to human rights evaluation, 
advocacy and other human rights activities carried out in China by 
international NGOs and claimed that western human rights NGOs 
interfered with China’s internal affairs and aroused social instability 
 
 
 54. Ye Zhang, China’s Emerging Civil Society, PERSPECTIVES, Sept. 30, 2006, at 9, 
http://www.oycf.org/oycfold/httpdocs/Perspectives2/22_093003/Perspectives_092003.pdf. 
 55. Qiu & Liu, supra note 37, at 47. 
 56. Shan Shi, Zhongguo jia qiang kong zhi guo nei fei zheng fu zu zhi [China Strengthens 
Control of Domestic NGOs], RADIO FREE ASIA, Sept. 1, 2006, http://www.rfa.org/mandarin/ 
yataibaodao/ ngo-20060901.html/. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Thomas, supra note 44, at 392–93. 
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by publicly criticizing and humiliating China’s human rights 
status.59 The Chinese government also strongly opposed foreign 
involvement on issues relating to China’s political independence or 
territorial integrity such as advocacy for free Tibet. For example, 
recently it accused international NGOs of supporting riots in the 
Tibetan capital Lhasa in March 2008 which later spread to other 
parts of China and turned into protests and obstacles to the Olympic 
torch relay. In a news report the government points out that there 
are several hundred backup groups for the “Dalai Lama Clique,” 
including specialized NGOs and other groups that sympathize with 
the Dalai Lama and attack China’s Tibet policy.60 
C. Differential Treatment 
In practice, for the reasons mentioned above, the state seeks to foster 
certain types of foreign NGOs and to quell those with politically sensitive 
agendas. Thus NGOs working in the fields of disaster and poverty relief, 
the environment, health, education, and services for the disabled are 
actively welcomed by the Chinese government. For example, to help 
alleviate poverty, the Chinese government is willing to enlist help from 
international NGOs and has signed cooperation agreements with quite a 
few international NGOs to fight poverty and engage in community 
development projects.61 According to the U.S. Embassy in China: 
China’s environmental authorities in particular have a generally 
positive attitude toward environmental NGO’s [sic] . . . . According 
to one NGO, the government sees these NGO’s [sic] as capable of 
motivating large groups of volunteers to act for a common cause in 
non-controversial areas, such as recycling, tree planting or anti-litter 
campaigns. In addition, national-level environmental officials said 
they welcomed the help of NGO’s [sic] and the media in exposing 
corruption and malfeasance related to environmental enforcement.  
 
 
 59. Erping Li, Problems Faced by Chinese Human Rights NGOs and a Way Out, FA SHANG 
YANJIU [LAW AND COMMERCE STUDY], 12–17. 
 60. Da lai ji tuan xi zang nao shi, guo ji fei zheng fu zu zhi wei qi cheng yao [Dalai Clique 
Making Trouble in Tibet and International NGOs Supporting Them], CHINA.COM, Apr. 2, 2008, 
available at http://news.china.com/zh_cn/focus/tibet08/11066916/20080402/14761917.html. 
 61. Lifang Wang, Wo guo yin ru guo ji fei zheng fu zu zhi can yu fu pin kai fa gong zuo [China 
Enlisting International NGOs to Participate in Poverty Alleviation and Development], available at 
http://www.cpad.gov.cn/data/2006/0601/article_2000.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2008). 
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 In over a dozen conversations with domestic and foreign NGO’s 
[sic] working in the environmental area, Embassy officers did not 
hear of a single organization that failed to get off the ground—
sooner or later—or was forced to close due to the inability to legally 
register.”62  
In contrast, those international NGOs with politically sensitive agendas 
involving issues like human rights or democracy are subject to stringent 
restrictions. It is reported that the government will adopt more stringent 
measures to restrict contacts between domestic NGOs and overseas human 
rights NGOs. In August 2005, the Chinese government closed down the 
Renzhiquan Workshop, an NGO focusing on human rights issues in China 
that received financial support from an American NGO.63 Further, the 
Ministry of State Security made it clear that foundations like the Ford 
Foundation are motivated by a desire to bring about “peaceful evolution” 
and has therefore assigned personnel to strictly supervise and control 
projects to be implemented by them.64  
Yet foreign NGOs are nevertheless playing an important role in some 
parts of Chinese political reform. Although the central government 
leadership has not embraced the idea of large-scale political reform, many 
meaningful reform initiatives are taking place at the local level. Perhaps 
most importantly, there is a growing consensus within China on the need 
to end official corruption, limit state power, and establish greater 
government transparency and accountability. Village election and self-
governance exemplify this trend. From the 1990s onward, Western NGOs 
(such as the Carter Center, International Republican Institute (“IRI”) and 
Ford Foundation) became actively involved in village elections and 
autonomy in China by providing funds, technical support, and training and 
by assisting in the design of programs and development strategies, etc.65 
“In 1994, IRI became the first western organization permitted to observe 
Chinese village elections. Since then, IRI has observed close to 60 
elections in provinces throughout the country.”66 The Carter Center 
 
 
 62. EMBASSY BEIJING, supra note 33. 
 63. Qiang Wu, Beijing NGO Closed upon Visit of UN Human Right Commissioner, 
DEUTSCHEWELLE, Aug. 30, 2005, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,1695765,00.html. 
 64. Shi, supra note 56. 
 65. Wenhu Yan, Shi lun fei zheng fu zu zhi dui wo guo jia an quan de ying xiang [The Influence 
of NGOs on China’s National Security], XI BEI DI ER MIN ZU XUAN YUAN XUE BAO [J. SECOND 
NORTHWEST U. FOR NATIONALITIES], 2006(1), at 119, 121, http://caod.oriprobe.com/articles/ 
10109371/On_Impacts_on_China_s_National_Security_of_NGOs.htm (article available for a fee). 
 66. International Republican Institute (IRI), China Country Page, http://www.iri.org/asia/china. 
asp (last visited Oct. 1, 2008). 
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similarly kicked off its China Village Elections Project in 1997 and signed 
a three-year agreement of cooperation with the Ministry of Civil Affairs in 
2000. Signing this agreement has given the Center the ability  
to work primarily in four Chinese provinces to install computers 
and software to collect village election data, to conduct training of 
election officials and elected villager committee members in any 
province in China, to observe village elections everywhere, to help 
conduct civic education, and to invite Chinese election officials to 
observe US elections and elections that are monitored by The Carter 
Center in other parts of the world.67  
Considering the usual attitude of the Chinese government toward 
foreign interference in its domestic political regime, many would be 
surprised to know that the Chinese government has accepted assistance 
from foreign NGOs in village election and governance. This cooperation is 
due to several factors. First, the Chinese government endeavors to enlist 
various forces including foreign NGOs to improve its image in the world. 
Former President Jiang Zemin commented that village elections were 
practical evidence of the increasing democracy in China.68 Second, village 
election in rural areas will not undermine the fundamental basis of China’s 
political regime. Third, foreign NGOs provide financial resources and 
technical support needed for village elections. Although realizing that 
foreign NGOs can sometimes be “trouble–makers,” the Chinese 
government still believes it can control the activities of NGOs and utilize 
them to its benefit.69 International NGOs, aware of the government’s 
worries, remained cautious in focusing on providing technical support and 
opinions and avoided touching on fundamental issues concerning the 
political regime. Instead, they gave encouragement and positive opinions 
to such reform efforts and developed trust with the Chinese government. 
As a result, their support and opinions were gladly received by the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs.70  
 
 
 67. Yawei Liu, Assoc. Dir., Village Elections Project, The Carter Center, Statement at 
Roundtable on Village Elections in China, Congressional-Executive Comm’n on China (July 8, 2002), 
available at http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/1039.pdf.; see also China Program: Project 
Chronology Carter Center, available at http://www.cartercenter.org/peace/china_elections/chronology 
(last visited Oct. 1, 2008). 
 68. See, e.g., Yawei Liu, China’s Village Elections, Statement to the Roundtable on Village 
Elections in China (Jan. 9, 2003), available at http://www.chinaelections.net/newsinfo.asp?newsid= 
7280. 
 69. Youxing Lang, Wai guo fei zheng fu zu zhi yu Zhongguo cun min xuan ju [Foreign NGOs 
and Village Election in China], ZHEJIANG XUEKAN [ZHEJIANG SCHOLARLY J.], 2004(4), at 143, 145. 
 70. Id. at 146. 
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The strategies adopted by foreign NGOs reflect an understanding of the 
social-political reality of China. They realized the difficulty of playing a 
meaningful role in China’s democratization process without the Chinese 
government’s cooperation.71  
III. PRACTICAL ALTERNATIVES FOR FOREIGN NGOS AND OUTLOOK FOR A 
UNIFORM LEGISLATION 
A. Possible Alternative Methods of Operating As a Foreign NGO 
The lack of clearly defined rules and procedures for registration is a 
great barrier to NGOs intending to register and work in China. In practice, 
however, NGOs with established programs have found various alternative 
ways of operating.  
1. Registering As a Foreign Enterprise 
Several international NGOs operating in China have opted to register 
as an “enterprise” with the Bureau of Industry and Commerce (Gong 
shang ju). Although this may not seem an appropriate route, it confers 
useful official status, including the right to open bank accounts in the 
organization’s name, to write officially recognized receipts, and to 
officially hire Chinese national staff. International NGOs registered as 
foreign enterprises in China include Save the Children, Plan International, 
CBN, and the Nature Conservancy.  
In the late 1980s, Save the Children UK began to undertake community 
development and education projects in the Yunnan Province, the Anhui 
Province, and the Tibet Autonomous Region through its office in Hong 
Kong. In 1995, its program office moved from Hong Kong to Kunming in 
the Yunnan Province and registered as a foreign enterprise, becoming the 
first international NGO to be officially registered in the Yunnan 
Province.72 Another example is CBN China, which was officially 
registered with the Chinese government as a foreign enterprise in 1999, 
functioning as a humanitarian organization and representative office of the 
Virginia-based CBN.73 
 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Hao Zhou, Poverty Alleviation Activities by Save the Children (UK), China Program, 
http://www.help-poverty.org.cn/helpweb2/ngoyj/ngoyj8.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2008). 
 73. See http://www.cbnchina.com/en/home.cfm (last visited Aug. 10, 2008). 
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2. Opening a Program Office or Project Management Office 
Some international NGOs have opened project offices at local or 
provincial levels and carried out work on the basis of their project office 
status. No formal registration procedure is required for opening a project 
office. This is probably the most widely used method of operation 
employed by international NGOs in China.  
Opening a project office at the local level is relatively 
straightforward, given the good-will of a local partner agency: —
either a government department (Health, Agriculture, Education, 
etc), a ‘mass organisation such as the Women’s Federation, a 
people’s government at county or city level, or an academic 
institution. Within the terms of a signed memorandum of 
understanding, partners of this kind can usually facilitate . . . 
opening a local programme office (provided the scale of the project 
merits it) and arrange visas, residency permits etc for international 
staff and visiting consultants.74  
3. Funding Projects from Overseas 
Easiest of all is simply to fund projects implemented by Chinese 
agencies from a base outside of China. Such foreign funding requires only 
that an NGO identify an appropriate partner, reach an agreement with that 
partner, and hand over the money. Provided the Chinese partner is a 
legally recognized entity, bureaucratic obstacles are unlikely. It is also 
possible, from a base outside of China, to negotiate project agreements 
giving the foreign NGO more of a hands-on role, e.g., coming in 
occasionally not just to monitor progress, but also to act as a consultant 
and/or trainer. Numerous international NGOs support work in China in 
this way, to their own satisfaction.75  
International NGOs can also enter into cooperation arrangements with 
legally established Chinese NGOs and provide grant funding and technical 
support to such Chinese NGOs. Indeed, some Chinese NGOs, such as the 
Nanjing-based Amity Foundation, rely almost exclusively on support from 
a wide range of international partners. Some of China’s largest non-profit 
organizations, like the Youth Development Foundation, Disabled Persons 
 
 
 74. Frequently Asked Questions on Registering an International NGO in China, CHINA DEV. 
BRIEF, Aug. 10, 2004, http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.com/node/296. 
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Federation, or Chinese Charities Federation, have working relationships 
with many international organizations.76 
4. Other Examples 
In June 2005, Lions Clubs China was officially registered in Beijing 
under the 1998 Regulations. Lions Clubs International, an international 
charity organization renowned for its work to help Chinese ophthalmic 
patients regain eyesight, launched programs in China in 1997. The 
registration of Lions Clubs China was seen by many as a “milestone” for 
foreign NGOs. To be precise, however, this was not a successful “landing” 
of Lions Clubs International in China, but rather, following the special 
mode of operation established by Lions Clubs International throughout its 
history, Lions Clubs China was officially registered as a Chinese NGO 
and then joined Lions Club International.77  
Another international charity group, Rotary International, which has 
been engaged in medical aid programs in China since 1989, formed two 
provisional clubs in Beijing and Shanghai in 2001 with the Chinese 
government’s understanding. But these clubs are not officially recognized 
and must wait for the finalization of policies and laws before they can 
obtain an official charter.78 
All unregistered international NGOs share the same problem of having 
no legal status, which causes trouble not only for developing members and 
receiving donations, but also for recruiting employees and entry-exit 
procedures.79 But these procedures are not absolutely essential for NGOs 
to work effectively in China, particularly if their operations are fairly small 
scale. If the international NGO  
can show that [it is] cooperating with a recognised Chinese agency, 
and if [it is] not doing anything that is particularly contentious or 
sensitive, it is unlikely that it will encounter any kind of trouble 
arising from not having official registration and status, apart from 
 
 
 76. EMBASSY BEIJING, supra note 33. 
 77. Yuchen Zhu, Global Links Initiative (GLI), Guo ji shi zi hui cheng li: shi fou wei guo ji NGO 
deng lu Zhongguo da kai men feng? [Establishment of Lions Club China: A Door Open for 
International NGOs to Land in China?] (June 4, 2005), http://www.glinet.org/standard.asp?id=687. 
 78. Wen Huang, Rotary Global History Fellowship (RGHF), The Long Road Back to China, 
http://www.rotaryfirst100.org/global/asia/clubs/longroad.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2008). 
 79. Yunxing Zhang, Int’l NGOs in China, CHINA.ORG.CN, Oct. 23, 2005, http://www.china.org. 
cn/archive/2005-10/23/content_1146251.htm. 
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the practical difficulties of not being able to open a bank account in 
the name of the organisation.80  
B. Russian NGO Law: A Model for China? 
Due to the Chinese government’s concerns over the increasing 
presence of foreign NGOs in China, their access to the country is a 
delicate issue whose resolution largely lacks a legal framework. However, 
as China seeks ever-increasing participation and integration into the 
international community, it cannot ignore the contributions made by 
foreign NGOs to its development, nor can it turn a blind eye to the de 
facto presence of foreign NGOs in China and the increasing pressure to 
grant them legal status.  
Recently the passage of a new NGO law in Russia caught the attention 
of Chinese officials and scholars, as China is seeking to formulate its own 
policy and rule on foreign NGOs. Federal Law No. 18-FZ, signed on 
January 10, 2006, by President Vladimir Putin, appears on its face to 
further restrict and reign in NGO operations in Russia.81 The NGO 
legislation requires Russia’s 450,000 civic clubs to re-register with a state 
authority in order to remain active. Foreign NGOs will be required to 
notify the Justice Ministry of the location of any offices.82 The new law 
provides broader grounds for denying registration to organizations.83 Both 
foreign and national NGOs will also have to provide detailed reports to 
authorities of any foreign funding and how such funds are spent. 
Furthermore, the legislation will give officials the power to close any non-
profit organization involved in “political activity.”84 Yet the bill is also 
intended to develop a legal structure to increase accountability and ensure 
the transparency of expenditures, operations, and funder information. In 
fact, some say the law is a response to Russian officials’ perception of the 
role foreign organizations played in creating the Rose Revolution in 
Georgia and the Orange Revolution in the Ukraine. Others believe that the 
 
 
 80. Frequently Asked Questions on Registering an International NGO in China, supra note 74. 
 81. Michael P. Maxwell, NGOs in Russia: Is the Recent Russian NGO Legislation the End of 
Civil Society in Russia?, 15 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 235, 236 (2006). 
 82. William Fisher, Russia: NGO Law Could Strengthen Civil Society, Group Argues, INTER 
PRESS SERVICE NEWS AGENCY (IPS), Jan. 25, 2006, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=31908. 
 83. “Registration to a branch of a foreign NGO may be denied by the proper executive authority 
if its ‘goals and objectives . . . create a threat to the sovereignty, political independence, territorial 
integrity, national unity, unique character, cultural heritage and national interests of the Russian 
Federation.’” Maxwell, supra note 81, at 253. 
 84. Id. at 256–57. 
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law is a response to a spying scandal in which Russia’s Federal Security 
Service (“FSB”) uncovered four MI6 intelligence agents from Britain who 
were involved in transmitting classified information using a fake rock 
containing a radio transmitter. Russian officials claim that the British 
agents were responsible for distributing “Foreign Office grants to 12 
organizations, including the Moscow Helsinki Group, one of Russia’s 
oldest and most respected human-rights organizations.”85  
With the same communist background and a history of planned 
economics, China and Russia face many similar issues in social and 
political life. International NGO involvement in “color revolutions” of 
Central Asia and Eastern Europe and other political activities has been 
interpreted by the Russian and Chinese governments as potential threats to 
their sovereignty. Some Western analysts believe that future Chinese NGO 
legislation will follow Russia’s lead.86 Although it is doubtful whether the 
Chinese government will follow suit, Russia’s NGO legislation certainly 
has influence and serves as an example, or at least could be an important 
reference, in China’s attempts to deal with similar concerns about foreign 
NGOs, as some Chinese scholars propose.87  
But notwithstanding the speculation, the most pressing task at present 
is to establish an explicit legal framework to provide a legal basis for, and 
to regulate the access and operations of, foreign NGOs in China. For 
example, quite a few Chinese scholars have proposed to change the 
“double registration and administration regime,” abolish the “sponsoring 
agency” requirement, and establish an effective supervision and 
accountability regime instead.88 In conclusion, the lack of registration 
procedure and regulatory provisions for international NGOs has not only 
excluded many NGOs from the legal framework, but it has also caused 
confusion and barriers for foreign NGOs trying to carry out work in China. 
It is time for the Chinese government to revisit this gray area and provide 
clear and constructive legal guidelines.  
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